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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Thomas Carbonneau
Adjudication is vital to society and its operations. The law and legal proceedings,
along with international acrimony, demonstrate that there is no end to human discord. In
the United States, fundamental political values are inextricably linked to law. The Bill of
Rights protects citizens from the State encroachments to their person and property.
Freedom is the principal attribute of American citizenship. Public law requires the State
to comply with an exacting level of due process when it seeks to restrict citizen freedoms.
American citizenship also sports a more private and mundane face. The daily life
of the American citizen can lead to conflicts that engender private civil disputes. Public
law guarantees still apply to legal proceedings involving private claims between
individual citizens.
There are evident differences between criminal and civil
proceedings, the most evident of which is the standard for reaching a liability
determination (beyond a reasonable doubt as opposed to a preponderance of the
evidence). Fairness, in the form of the impartiality of decision-makers and parity
between the parties, however, applies to both processes—only the depth of the imprint
differs.
The costs and risks generally associated to litigation push both processes to avoid
trials and adjudicated outcomes. Plea-bargains are prevalent in criminal trials and civil
trials often result in settlements. Justice, in effect, is done through the avoidance of trial
determinations. The uncertainty of pursuing rights guarantees is so great that parties
prefer to avoid the established machinery of justice. Ironically, the promise of justice is
most achievable when the mechanisms of justice are ignored.
The failure of justice processes to function as designed testifies both to the rigor
of the public law analysis and the virtual impossibility of achieving its ends. In most
cases, the required expenditure of resources exceeds both individual and societal
capabilities. The legal procedure demanded by the Constitution, even in civil matters,
becomes an unworkable burden. Nonetheless, American jurists would find it untenable
to adjust the foundational principles of the judicial trial and adapted them to the
exigencies of a more populous and complex society. In fact, these jurists would contend
that society, no matter its current status or stage of evolution, should conform to the
immutable verities of the law.
Arbitration intermediated the seismic rift between society’s need to resolve
conflict and the law’s unbending regime of adjudicatory governance by proffering a
remedy that was at once fair and functional. While a majority of the modern U.S.
Supreme Court has been favorably disposed to arbitration, other groups have advanced
more critical assessments of arbitral adjudication. The most controversial aspect of the
contemporary social usage and standing of arbitration centers upon adhesive arbitration
in employment and consumer matters. Criticism also flared regarding arbitration in the
state-investor context, relating to the business leanings and partiality of NAFTA
arbitrators, but the misgivings were quelled once hearings were open to the public.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s evaluation of arbitration bears the greatest practical
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weight, the critique made by various interest groups is based on a set of common values
that endorse the supremacy of the public law guarantees.
For some groups, arbitral adjudication is a profound wrong. Its simpleminded
vision of the trial should be relegated to the darkest recesses of specialized commercial
activities. Public justice tolerates no substitute—even when parties freely and willingly
consent to alternative processes. Justice is as singular as the Constitution that commands
it. Adjudication cannot take place without party-driven trials, extensive discovery and
record-building, unrelenting cross-examination, and the exhaustion of all possible
remedies, including appeal. For other groups, arbitration is the perfect private remedy—
an oasis of rationality in the turbulent lunacy of procedural justice. The obsession with
winning is replaced with a sensible protocol that posits that loss occasioned by a fair
hearing at the hands of a knowledgeable adjudicator is both acceptable and civilized.
Incessant lawyer advocacy is a false offering that services primarily the advocate’s
interest—not the client’s. Arbitration fulfills the promise of American citizenship and
does not impose a crushing surcharge on the operations of American society. It puts an
end to conflict in a traditionalist manner, yet avoids perpetual retakes and
reconsiderations.
The presence of arbitration at the center of the adjudicatory arena mandates that
society choose how it will behave. When citizens are in conflict, should society trust the
decision-makers or obligate them to assume the neutral status of a referee and thereby
endorse resolution through procedural protections implemented by advocates? Society’s
choice for civil adjudication is between two forms of trial—one that is disciplined, but
functional and effective and another that is dedicated to the protection of legal rights
through absolute procedural rectitudea form of protection so resolute that it
undermines its own operation. To a substantial degree, the choice represents a struggle
between endorsing the pragmatic and workable or what is painstakingly difficult and
inefficient—the myths surrounding the belief in the exclusive righteousness of
adjudication done pursuant to public law strictures. Will a mentality of achievement or a
belief in immutable truths prevail and become the backbone of adjudication in American
society? It is difficult to resist admiring what works, especially when the competing
choice is a rhetorical, often sanctimonious set of beliefs that frequently fail to provide
protection to anything or anyone.
The symposium participants have ably engaged in a discussion about the
protection of rights and considered in their assessment of remedies the allocation of
resources for competing social endeavors. There can be little doubt that arbitration
represents a nearly miraculous solution to the due process and affordability dilemma.
Because it is private, arbitration eliminates the demands on public resources and monies.
The general professionalism and self-interest of arbitrators and the presence of lawyers in
the proceedings validate arbitration as a rights protection mechanism. Southland1and the
latest per curiam opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court2 indicate that the federal right to
arbitrate is firmly rooted in U.S. law.3 For all intents and purposes, it is a right with
1
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constitutional dimensions that rivals the right to political expression and to be free of
invidious discrimination based on race. The Ninth Circuit,4 and increasingly the Second
Circuit,5 have dissented from the U.S. Supreme Court’s unfailing support of arbitration,
but the opposition—especially adamant in the matter of adhesion—has been ineffective
and is seemingly destined to remain so. Members of the Court disagree in different sets
of circumstances and, periodically, there are anti-arbitration decisions, but the support for
arbitration on the Court seems to be wide and deep.6
The only inkling of imperfect consensus resides in an apparently emerging power
struggle between the various players in the process as to which of them will set the
ultimate direction for the regulation of arbitration.7 Four players have the potential to
decide: the parties, the courts, the arbitrators, and arbitral institutions. A fifth player is
society at large acting through the legislative process, an institution which—since 1925—
has been remarkably and mercifully silent on the subject of arbitration. Freedom of
contract may be vital to the development of arbitration. The transborder and domestic
history of arbitration, however, indicates, without equivocation, that judicial approval and
support are crucial to its effectiveness. Courts can convert the most favorable statutory
regime into a jungle of deadly opposition.8 The California decisional law on arbitration
is a perfect illustration.9 It is evident at both the state and federal judicial levels that
current judges have been persuaded to support arbitration; they believe that they have a
duty to uphold arbitration agreements and awards given the U.S. Supreme Court’s
construction of the Federal Arbitration Act and the vibrant application of the federal
preemption doctrine.10 Accordingly, arbitrators ‘take the baton’ from the parties and,
with minimal supervision from arbitral institutions, conduct the proceedings and resolve
the merits, unless the agreement or the law places special restrains on their exercise of
power.
In the context of class action litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court has, on the one
hand, heralded the superiority of arbitration and contract choice and, on the other hand,
completely undermined the autonomous operation of arbitration by vacating the
arbitrators’ interpretation of the arbitration agreement as an ‘excess of authority.’ The
description of the contrastive approaches is reflected in the contradistinctive holdings in
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion11 and Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, Inc.12 The result in
AT&T Mobility establishes that class action waivers are a legitimate part of the bargain
for arbitration and dismisses adhesion as a flaw in the formation of an arbitration
4
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agreement.13 In a completely contrary vein, Stolt-Nielsen places significant and decisive
restraints on the ability of arbitrators to rule on matters that are instrumental to the
independence of the arbitral process.14 The difference in approach and result places a
cloud of indeterminacy over the future direction of arbitration law.
Stolt-Nielsen, like Hall Street Associates,15 Volt Information Sciences,16
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,17 Wilko v. Swan,18 may indicate a turning point in the U.S.
law of arbitration. There are clear problems with the privatizing of adjudication in
Western democratic societies. Despite 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett,19 the arbitrability of civil
rights claims remains a debatable addition to arbitrable subject matters. How arbitrators
are qualified and to whom or what they owe allegiance are concerns that remain
unaddressed despite the strength of the federal policy favoring arbitration and contract
freedom. Whether greater regulation or supervision of the arbitral process is a good idea
is another festering matter. Current practice has given the impartiality of arbitrators a
renewed significance in the litigious regulation of the arbitral process. 20 It is unclear
whether the latter has ‘improved’ the process or simply made it vulnerable to a new form
of attack from disgruntled parties. As the U.S. Supreme Court itself has made evident on
a number of occasions,21 greater litigation about arbitration, and its enhanced
adversarialization, will have alternative adjudication return, full circle, to the status quo
ante.
The definition and discussion of issues and procedural law are an important part
of justice in a democracy. It is clear that arbitration has become instrumental to the ‘life
of the law’22 and that the decisional work of the courts regulates the operation of the
arbitral process. Academic discussion like the one that has taken place are most valuable
when they assess the content of actual judicial holdings and contribute to maintaining a
functional and fair process of adjudication. I applaud both the student editors who so
ably organized this event and the distinguished academic lawyers who contributed to the
quality of the discussion—from a warning about oligarchs to the merger of alternative
remedies and including an evaluation of the impact of arbitration on administrative
processes and ending with a brief for the stakeholders of investment arbitration processes.
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